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I believe the draft DCID adequately reflects Bob Martin's principal points, except for his recommendation that Chairman/NIC have a central role:

- (1) Warning should range from "Big W" to "no surprise."
 - (2) Chairman, NIC should be the DCI's action officer for "no surprise" and should ensure that the NIOs "exert the necessary estimative discipline" so that all interagency products specify what events "are or are not likely."
 - (3) NIO/W should be a special assistant to the Chairman, NIC and should work with the regional NIOs, especially to ensure that the NIO monthly meetings are "more effectively used in support of the warning mission."
 - (4) NIO/W should participate in the production of NIEs, SNIEs, IIMs, and other Community products.
 - (5) NIO/W and his staff should generate I&W studies and develop new training opportunities geared to I&W.
 - (6) Warning staff should support the NIO/W, particularly on "Big W."
 - (7) The WWG should function as the "interagency managerial network."
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State Department review completed



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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June 8, 1982

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MEMORANDUM FOR:

[Redacted] National Intelligence Officer for Warning

FROM: Robert A. Martin
INR/PMA

SUBJECT: June 9 Warning Working Group Meeting

The WVG June 9 meeting will provide a most useful opportunity to begin discussing the DCI's May 28 memorandum on the warning issue. My colleagues and I have spent a number of hours discussing the memorandum, but are not sure as yet that we fully understand it. Tomorrow's discussion, and subsequent ones, will provide an excellent opportunity for the WVG to develop a common appreciation and understanding of exactly where things stand.

Prior to arriving at such a shared appreciation--so that our future work commences with all at a common starting point--it may be somewhat premature to take up the topics noted in your June 2 memorandum. Therefore, I believe that a general discussion of the DCI memorandum would be our best beginning.

In addition, it might be useful to address several hypothetical warning situations to see how each might be handled under the warning system envisaged in the DCI memorandum. I would suggest the following exemplary situations:

- a Soviet worldwide air stand down;
- a US-USSR crisis confrontation (for example, a Soviet note reopening the Berlin crisis);
- a third area war (the best example is probably an approaching Arab-Israeli war); and

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--a future economic crisis (for example, an impending worldwide wheat shortage two years hence).

A discussion of the four items above should be helpful to our understanding of the appropriate responsibilities and organizational arrangements between and among the various actors, groups and organizations germane to warning.

To facilitate our discussion I am sending copies of this memo to our WWC colleagues.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

December 11, 1981

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MEMORANDUM FOR:

National Intelligence Officer For
WarningFROM: Robert A. Martin
INR/PMA

SUBJECT: Comments On Your December 4 Draft Report

REF: INR Memo to NIO/W of September 23
INR Memo to NIO/W of October 23
INR Memo to NIO/W of November 6

Rather than trying to cope with the mass of the December 4 draft, I believe it will be more straightforward and less cumbersome just to provide you with the attached memorandum. It contains the views of the Department of State member of the Warning Working Group. I request you circulate it to our colleagues on the WWG, and arrange for the NFIB Secretariat to circulate it with your report for the NFIB meeting.

In view of the discussion we have had in the WWG, particularly at our last meeting on November 12, I was somewhat surprised at the length, and in some degree the content of the December 4 paper. I had understood we had agreed (at the least there was generally expressed sentiment) November 12 that my November 6 memo provided the most useful model for further drafting in terms of both size and general content. I do not presume to speak for them, but certainly on November 12 those views were expressed by the CIA and DIA representatives.

In any event, I find it difficult to come to grips with the issues as they are contained in the December 4 draft. Therefore, I have laid out my views, drawing principally on

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my November 6 memo, but also on the earlier INR September 23 and October 23 memos, which when discussed by the WWG attracted favorable comment for crispness, concision, coherence and comprehensibility, as well as content.

Attachment:

As stated

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December 11, 1981

STATE WWG MEMBER'S VIEWS ON THE NATIONAL WARNING QUESTION

The following comments reflect the views of the Department of State member of the Warning Working Group on the national warning question, and an appropriate approach to do the job which takes into account existing institutions, structures and procedures:

DEFINING THE WARNING MISSION

We envisage "warning" in the broadest sense falling into three slices: Big W, Little W, and No Surprise. "Big W" relates to possible attack on the US, its forces overseas or its allies; "Little W" refers to all other crises involving a threat of initiation of hostilities. Both Big and Little W involve similar methodology of indications intelligence, and taken together constitute a distinct professional discipline. A "No Surprise" doctrine includes, in addition to Big and Little W, a wide array of other events of substantial importance to US policy and interests. It also involves a broad range of disciplines, including political, military, economic, sociological, and scientific and technical.

The "warning" writ should be as wide (including "no surprise") as can be efficiently and effectively undertaken. We feel that current institutions and procedures, newly sensitized, can adequately handle even the elements of a "no surprise" requirement. On the other hand, those elements of the system dedicated to handling problems arising from possible attack on the US and other threats of initiation of hostilities (Big and Little W), should not be burdened with the tasks implied by a "no surprise" doctrine. That is the task of the DCI and the Intelligence Community as a whole.

ORGANIZING FOR WARNINGA. THE ROLE OF THE DCI

As the President's Senior Intelligence Officer, the DCI has responsibility for National Intelligence Warning, most importantly strategic warning, but he must oversee the entire effort.

B. THE CHAIRMAN, NIC

The Chairman of the National Intelligence Council should be the DCI's action officer for this entire effort, responsible for ensuring coordination of all the "no surprise"

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situations and Alert Memoranda through the regional and functional NIO network.

Specifically, the Chairman, NIC should be responsible for ensuring that NIOs exert the necessary estimative discipline so that all interagency products--including Alert Memoranda--specify to the extent possible what events are or are not likely, why such a judgment has been reached, and what indications there might be to suggest that such events were becoming more or less likely.

C. THE NIO/WARNING

Since Big and Little W situations overlap regional NIOs, and include either or both NIOs responsible for general purpose and theater forces and strategic programs, and because I&W intelligence constitutes a discrete discipline, the NIO/W should be a special assistant to the Chairman, NIC, with specific responsibility for warning of possible hostilities or other threatening military activities. The NIO/W, working with the regional and functional NIOs, as agent for the Chairman, NIC, would be charged with applying to all interagency efforts related to Big and Little W the same estimative discipline through the I&W prism as noted above for the Chairman, NIC.

One task would be to assure that the monthly meetings held by the various NIOs were more effectively used in support of the warning mission. NIO/W or one of his staff would review the agenda, attend the monthly meetings, and ensure that there was a specific warning component in the product. In particular, the NIO/W and his staff would contribute indications lists on specific crises or problems. The main responsibility of the NIO/W and his staff at NIO monthly warning meetings should be to provide the analytical basis in support of what indications to look for next if a situation deteriorates. This would sensitize the Community, and provide additionally needed focus and emphasis on warning. NIO meetings and/or the warning products from them could be issued once per month, or more frequently as required.

NIO/W should ensure that NIEs, SNIEs, IIMs and other IC products are as supportive as possible of warning requirements, and that issues and questions relevant to

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warning are appropriately covered in these papers. NIO/W should participate in the production schedule, should propose special studies as he deems required, and should work with the other NIOs to see that warning is adequately addressed in any study.

NIO/W and his staff would also work closely with NFAC and the other producers of current intelligence and longer range analysis and assessments to enhance general sensitivity to warning and its requirements. Specifically, the NIO/W and his staff could generate I&W studies of strategic attack on the US, as well as additional potential regional warning situations beyond Europe and Korea (e.g., the Middle East, Southwest Asia, Southeast Asia).

Further, basic studies on I&W methodology should be undertaken. Such work should aim to focus Community attention on developments which will change warning assessments, either to deny indications or to create opportunities to develop or exploit new ones. NIO/W could also usefully participate in planning in the arms control field on measures relating to warning enhancement, e.g., confidence building measures in CDE, and associated measures in MBFR.

Although requests to produce Alert Memoranda can come from any quarter, the NIO/W has a special responsibility for those involving potential military actions. Current procedures for producing AMs seem adequate.

NIO/W should develop new training opportunities specifically geared to I&W. He should assist in the development of courses within the Intelligence Community.

D. WARNING STAFF

With the Strategic Warning Staff already under the NIO/W's aegis, it would make sense for these resources to be designated as the "Warning Staff" responsible for supporting the NIO/W in the tasks outlined above. A principal task for these resources (as specified in DCID 1/5) should be the strategic warning mission.

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Overall the NIO/W and his staff should have sufficient resources to monitor, coordinate and enhance US intelligence activities related to warning of military action, but all within the general managerial structure and the substantive programs falling under the Chairman, NIC.

E. WARNING WORKING GROUP

The Warning Working Group should be maintained as the interagency managerial network to prepare and coordinate responses and proposals to NFIB on warning matters.

SOME THOUGHTS ON ALTERNATIVE ANALYSIS AND DEVIL'S ADVOCACY

There is some tendency to equate alternative analysis with devil's advocacy. There is a difference, and blurring the two leads to unfortunate confusion.

The Community has always valued alternative analysis. The different agencies provide insurance against missed alternative hypotheses because each agency--by role and responsibility--is sensitive to one or more of the repercussions of possible developments. DIA and the Services, for example, are the eyes and ears of those responsible for meeting and defeating a possible attack, and by their very role will be forced to examine worst case possibilities. INR, in the same fashion, must be alert to situations requiring diplomatic actions, and has a stake in avoiding an overreaction to ambiguous indications. Similarly, CIA and NSA have a stake in adequate collection and analysis; Treasury and DOE each have specific responsibilities and roles which sensitize them to potential developments which would affect them.

On the other hand, to provide for judgments which have only the one characteristic of institutionalized pessimism is to develop an entity responsible only to oppose--i.e., not to be better or to be right, but only to be different. It would amount to transferring the responsibility for reviewing all hypotheses from the line intelligence services--where it is

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and should remain--to a special staff with a role of warning only for the sake of warning. It is to suggest that the DCI not demand what he should demand of the various agencies. And it is to ensure that the Community always will speak with two voices and that warning, thus, will always be ambiguous.

THE ALLIES AND WARNING

Considerable progress has been made over the last several years with our NATO allies, particularly the key ones, on warning questions. Even so, the sharing of warning information and the philosophy of warning probably deserve a current look. However, it would be diverting to burden this NFIB with discussion of the subject. It might first be addressed by the WWG.

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